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The Inequity of Third-Party Bail Practices
Judge Patrick Carroll*
For many criminal defendants, a common source of bail funds is their
own family or friends. Such individuals typically assist in the expectation
that if the defendant complies with court orders and satisfies all court
appearances, their money will be returned to them. In revenue-motivated
court systems, however, bail funds—even when owned by a third party—
are often applied to the defendant’s fines and court costs, resulting in the
effective forfeiture of the friend or relative’s money. This Article reviews
the processes of third-party bonds, the risk that a third-party bond will
be incorrectly identified as the defendant’s asset, and the third party’s
rights regarding the ultimate disposition of the funds and other competing claims on the bail. It calls attention to a little-considered issue in
current calls for bail reform and criminal justice reform generally—one
that affects not only defendants, but also their families and support systems. The use of third-party funds to pay fines and fees is unfair to friends
and relatives who, in their haste to collect bond for the defendant and
perhaps with little knowledge of the criminal justice system, may not understand the full extent of their financial risk. It also produces a breakdown of justice in that a third party’s payment of a fine fails to accomplish
the goal of monetary penalties in the criminal justice system.

* Retired Judge Patrick Carroll served as Lakewood (Ohio) Municipal Court judge from 1990
through 2021. A 1977 graduate of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, he worked as a prosecutor
in Cuyahoga County and in private practice prior to being appointed to the bench. This Article grew
out of research for an annual course provided by the Judicial College of the Ohio Supreme Court
to Ohio judges on the impact of imposing and collecting fines, court costs, and restitution in criminal cases. The author acknowledges the initiative and leadership of Ohio Supreme Court Chief
Justice Maureen O’Connor, her support of Ohio judges, and her determination that courts should
not be considered a vehicle for revenue enhancement. Chief Justice O’Connor’s leadership and
concern for the impact and purpose of fines and court costs in criminal cases have also been recognized by Christopher Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prison, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 41
(2016), Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1024,
1030, (Feb. 2016), and Jocelyn Rosnick & Mike Brickner, The Ohio Model for Combatting Debtors’ Prisons, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 375, 385 (2016).
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INTRODUCTION
The scope of this Article involves the rights and consequences of a
person who posts bail for a defendant in a criminal case. The Article reviews a third party’s initial involvement in the court system when posting
a cash bond, the risk of incorrectly including a third-party bond as the
defendant’s asset, the impact on the stakeholders in a criminal case, the
rights of the third party regarding the money posted as bail against other
competing claims, and the third party’s rights regarding the ultimate disposition of the bail funds.
One of the underlying issues is the ultimate use of the bail money applied to the fines and court costs of the defendant to generate court revenue, resulting, effectively, in the third party’s forfeiture of the money.
Funding local courts is a constant problem. With a unified court system,
such as Delaware, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania, funding for courts on
all levels is done on a statewide basis.1 In most other states, however, the
local municipal/traffic courts are separate from the rest of the court system and are dependent on local government funding, with pressure for
courts to be financially self-sufficient.2 Regardless of the funding source,

1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 105; MASS. GEN. LAWS, pt. III, ch. 221, § 34C; 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 3521–32.
2. Rebekah Diller, Court Fees as Revenue?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 30, 2008),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/court-fees-revenue
[https://perma.cc/B7CY-6SYC].
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misdemeanor and traffic courts are often viewed by local officials as revenue generators.3
Notwithstanding any statutory restrictions, judges possess inherent authority to control and process a case and enforce their own judgments,
which includes the imposition of fines and court costs in a criminal case.4
As a result, procedures may vary from court to court or among judges in
the same court.5 Third-party bail funds can become a revenue source that
is already in the court’s possession and control. In 2016, the National
Center for State Courts convened a national task force on fines, fees, and
bail practices addressing court self-funding by fines and court costs.6 The
task force report focused primarily on the negative impact of this practice
on defendants in criminal cases and the public perception it creates by
emphasizing revenue over the administration of justice and access to
courts.
The ongoing discussion of bail practices and reform often overlooks a
third party who posted the bond for the defendant.7 The amount of a bond
may range from a few hundred dollars in a low-level misdemeanor case

3. See PUB. AFFS. RSCH. COUNS. OF ALA., UNIFIED, BUT NOT UNIFORM: JUDICIAL FUNDING
ISSUES IN ALABAMA 10 (2014), https://www.alabar.org/assets/2015/03/PARCA-Court-CostStudy-FINAL-3-5-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5VD-KLYK] (“[T]he economic difficulties of recent
years have led the Legislature to . . . increas[e] the reliance on court fees and temporary revenue
sources . . . .”); YOLAINE MENYARD ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, PRICE OF JUSTICE: CHALLENGING THE FUTURE OF FINES AND FEES 3 (2020), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2020-11/Guide_POJ_09302020.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8PC-CJT6]
(“[Fines and fees] are . . . used to fund basic court operations in the absence of adequate state
funding.”).
4. Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU, Inc., No. C 07-01389-JW, 2008 WL 8820476, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
June 25, 2008) (finding that courts have inherent authority to order specific performance to comply
with settlement agreements and impose fines alongside their statutory authority to enter a judgment). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 959 A.2d 637, 644 (Conn. App. Ct., 2008) (holding that lower
court’s act of holding defendant in contempt was not clearly erroneous when lower court drew
inferences from facts on the record).
5. Not all policies and practices discussed in this article are practiced by all courts. Moreover,
the exercise of a judge’s discretion contributes to the varying practices. The purpose of this article
is to highlight the practices that detrimentally impact either the third party who posted the bail or
the defendant in a criminal case.
6. The findings of the task force were approved and adopted by Conference of Chief Justices
and the Conference of Court Administrators. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CONF. OF
CHIEF JUSTS. & CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, RESOLUTION 4 IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://ccj.ncsc.
org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/28042/01312018-support-principles-national-task-force-finesfees-bail.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS45-QGBH].
7. This article is not about the professional bail bondsman who charges a nonrefundable percentage for the bail set by the court in exchange for guaranteeing the defendant’s appearance.
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to several thousand dollars in a major drug or fraud case.8 Typically, third
parties pay with the assumption that the money will be returned at the end
of the case if the defendant complies with all court orders and appearances; however, a third party ultimately may lose that money if it is applied to the defendant’s fines, court costs, restitution, or other fees.
The relationship and personal history between the defendant and the
third party is critical. As that person is usually a relative or friend who
knows the defendant, the bond is posted with a genuine belief that the
defendant is a good risk, likely to show up for court appearances.9 Implicit in this relationship is the defendant’s incentive to appear in court to
avoid the loss of funds to family members or friends if the defendant absconds.10
Without knowing the facts of the criminal charge, the friend or relative
may believe the defendant is innocent and the case will soon be over, with
8. See, e.g., United States v. Wilks, 15 F.4th 842, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2021) (releasing defendant
on a $5,000 bond for a drug offense). The Wilks court also acknowledged that while the lower court
had discretion when setting bail, it was required to go beyond citing the statutory factors involved
and to discuss, analyze, or explain the reason for denying bail or setting a high bail. Id. at 848. See
also Ex Parte Briscoe, No. 02-15-00223-CR, 2015 WL 5893470, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 8, 2015)
(“Relatively recent cases involving non-theft, non-drug, and first-degree felonies have approved
bail in amounts ranging from $50,000 to $1,000,000.”); Sullivan v. City of New York, No. 14-CV1334, 2015 WL 5025296, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2015) (denying excessive bail claim on
grounds that amount of bail is discretionary within a wide range of amounts); Ex parte Alba, 469
S.W.2d 188, 188–89 (Tex. Crim. App. July 14, 1971) (affirming bail at $90,000 by weighing nature
of offense, severity of potential punishment, and probability of conviction against finding an excessive sum). But see STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THIRD EDITION: PRETRIAL RELEASE §
10-1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (stating that, although relevant to determining amount of type of bail
or pretrial release, seriousness of charge should be reviewed in terms of other factors). See also
State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276, 1278 (N.M. 2014) (reversing bail set solely based on gravity of
offense).
9. CATHERINE S. KIMBRELL & DAVID B. WILSON, GEO. MASON UNIV., MONEY BOND PROCESS EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS
6, 9 (2016), https://university.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=4ce69b9e-36d1-328f30e3-416ee82abbdf [https://perma.cc/JVF4-4HYR] (finding that, among study participants who
planned to post bond or were unsure at the time, fifty-one percent of participants reported planning
to receive help from a family member); SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., WHO PAYS? THE
TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 13–14 (2015), http://whopaysreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/B375-6LG8] (finding that sixtythree percent of participants reported that family members were primarily responsible for covering
conviction-related costs); MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, A DECADE OF BAIL
RESEARCH
IN
NEW
YORK
CITY
85
(2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
scans/DecadeBailResearch12.pdf [https://perma.cc/G64S-BR67] (reporting that family members
are more likely to post bond than defendants themselves).
10. A concise and informative history and evolution of monetary bail is set out in State v.
Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 349–51 (Minn. 2000), pointing out that before the rise of commercial
bondsmen, intrinsic in the bail system was the reliance that the accused or a reputable friend or
relative would be willing to post sufficient cash or property to guarantee the defendant’s appearance. See also Brown, 338 P.3d at 1283–88 (discussing historical origins of bail in English common
law as well as modern concept of excessive bail in United States); State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874,
878–80 (Vt. 2006) (rejecting cash-only bail for a secured appearance bond).
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the bail funds returned. It is not uncommon for persons involved in illegal
drugs, sexual misconduct, or embezzlement to conceal their activities
from family or friends.11 Drug use and drug-related offenses may come
as a complete surprise to the person posting bond and unaware of the
defendant’s situation or potential criminal liability.
While the person posting the bond may be able to gauge the risks of
the defendant’s appearance in court, he or she is almost certainly not able
“to gauge the merits of the case against the defendant and make a gamble
as to its outcome.”12 Most likely, the only factor considered by the third
party, whose money is held by the court, is the high probability the money
will be returned if the defendant makes all of the court appearances. It is
generally assumed that it will be the defendant, if found guilty, who will
deal with any fines or court costs—not the third party, whose involvement
was limited to posting bond for a friend. The defendant’s nonappearance
in court is a foreseeable risk that the third party assumes when posting
bail. The amount of any fine or other financial obligations imposed on
the defendant if found guilty, however, is an unforeseeable risk the third
party neither agreed to nor intended when posting bail.
It is not practical to ensure that a third party fully understands the potential complete loss of the bail funds posted if the defendant is later
found guilty. The unsuspecting or unsophisticated person with little or no
exposure to the criminal justice system, called unexpectedly and working
as fast as possible to obtain the release of a friend or relative, cannot be
expected to understand what is commonplace to the police officer or clerk
who is processing the bail. Specific legal terms are foreign to the average
person, who may not realize the full consequences when instructed to pay
a specific amount, sign a receipt, and wait for the defendant to be processed and released.
For misdemeanor offenses on a bond schedule, generally only ten percent of bail, or a few hundred dollars, is required to obtain the defendant’s
release.13 In other cases, a judge may have previously set the bond.
11. See generally Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship,
in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY 377 (Kevin M. Beaver, J.C.
Barnes & Brian B. Boutwell eds., 2014), https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/60294_Chapter_23.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDR6-WZ9B].
12. Commonwealth v. Kovalak, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 719, 722 (Wash. Cty. Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar.
10, 1981).
13. A bond schedule sets out predetermined monetary amounts for a defendant to post for release from jail when the court is not in session. The amount of the bond is generally set by level of
offense. A bond schedule provides a speedy and convenient method for release of those who have
no financial difficulty. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978). A bond schedule,
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Whether by schedule or court order, the defendant may be facing extended time in jail unless someone can come to his or her rescue and post
bond. The well-intentioned friend or relative does not realize that the
bond just became a down payment on a future fine for someone else’s
misdeed. This scene probably occurs every night throughout the country.
In many pretrial detentions, there is the issue of indigency. People with
moderate or higher incomes, as well as successful drug dealers and other
criminals, do not need to rely on someone else to post bail.14 When a third
party is called to post bail, it is because the defendant does not have the
financial resources to post it and needs help from others.15 The bond may
also have a significant impact on the third party, who is called to make
an unexpected cash payment intended for rent, food, or other family necessities.16
The purpose of a bond is to secure the defendant’s appearance in future
court hearings.17 Factors to be considered when setting bond include the
risk of flight; the defendant’s financial resources, and in some cases, the
risk of harm to the defendant, victim, or the community.18 It is not a down
payment for future fines. Numerous courts have repeatedly held that bail
is not intended to punish a defendant or enrich the government and should

however, is limited to the level of offense and the defendant’s financial situation and does not take
into consideration alternative conditions of release. Cf. Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620,
2016 WL 7116611, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016) (holding that a bond amount, set pursuant to
a bond schedule, that failed to account for individual defendant’s financial situation and alternative
conditions of release violated defendant’s right to due process).
14. “The high rate of pretrial detention in the United States is due to both the widespread use of
monetary bail and the limited financial resources of most defendants.” Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201 (2018).
15. See DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 9, at 13–14 (discussing payment of bail borne
by families); see also infra notes 143, 144.
16. In some cases, the risk to the third party may be more than financial. In Francis v. Lake
Charles Am. Press, 265 S.2d 206, 209, 214 (1972), the third party recovered damages from a newspaper that published an article mistakenly naming the third party who posted the bond, instead of
the defendant, who was arrested for voyeurism.
17. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 197 (1960) (Douglas, J.) (supervisory opinion). See
also How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/bail/
[https://perma.cc/93YE-HCS5] (“The purpose of bail is simply to ensure that defendants will appear for trial and all pretrial hearings for which they must be present.”).
18. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742–43 (1987) (construing federal Bail Reform Act
of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–42, 3145). See also Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1232–33,
1235–36 (1971) (construing §§ 3146 and 3148 for post-conviction bail on appeal).
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not be set with a view towards fines.19 In Cohen v. United States,20 Justice
William O. Douglas, in a single-justice opinion, held that requiring a bail
bond to operate as a supersedeas21 to a judgment for a fine is beyond the
bond’s intended purpose and results in excessive bail under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.22
In the federal court system, 28 U.S.C. § 2044 provides that a thirdparty bond may not be applied to a defendant’s fines or other financial
obligations unless it can be shown that the defendant owns the funds.23
This statute puts to rest, at least in the federal court system, the right of a
third-party bond depositor to recover the bail funds when the case is
19. See United States v. Powell, 639 F.2d 224, 225 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The purpose of bail is to
secure the presence of the defendant; its object is not to enrich the government or punish the defendant.”); United States v. Sparger, 79 F. Supp. 2d 714, 716–18 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (quoting Powell,
639 F.2d at 225).
In DuBose v. McGuffey, Slip Op. No. 2022-Ohio-8 (Ohio Jan. 4, 2022), the court held that in
the absence of a specific statute, public safety should not be considered when setting monetary bail,
but instead should be addressed by nonmonetary conditions of bond, such as no-contact orders,
house arrest, GPS monitoring, or other requirements specifically focused on maintaining public
safety. Id. at 9. A court may not impose excessive bail for the purpose of keeping an accused in jail.
Id. at 13. Monetary bail for public safety is beyond the statutory framework and therefore excessive.
Id. at 12–13.
20. Cohen v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 526, 527–28 (1962).
21. A supersedeas bond is an appellant’s bond to stay execution on a judgment during the pendency of the appeal. Purcell v. Thomas, 28 A.3d 1138, 1144 (D.C. 2011) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 190 (8th ed. 2004)). A supersedeas bond is an appellate bond to stay the proceedings
and is separate from a cost bond under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 7. Adsani v.
Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 70 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1998).
22. Cohen, 82 S. Ct. at 528. The decision by Justice Douglas was a supervisory, “in chambers”
opinion, made without the participation or concurrence of the entire court. See generally Daniel M.
Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of a Single Justice of the Supreme Court, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1159 (2008). Although a single-Justice opinion is limited and not binding precedent, other
courts have also adopted Justice Douglas’s reasoning. See United States v. Rose, 791 F.2d 1477,
1480 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that any conditions requiring a bail bond to be used for payment of
a fine are contrary to purposes of a bail bond under Eighth Amendment); Sparger, 79 F. Supp. 2d
at 718; State ex rel. Baker v. Troutman, 533 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ohio 1990) (stating that purpose
of bail is to ensure appearance). See also United States v. Feiner, No. 92-00548-01, 1993 WL
440605, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1993) (holding that government’s refusal to return defendant’s bail
post-conviction violated defendant’s due process rights).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2044, which provides in part:
The court shall not release any money deposited for bond purposes after a plea or a
verdict of the defendant’s guilt has been entered and before sentencing except upon a
showing that an assessment, fine, restitution or penalty cannot be imposed for the offense
the defendant committed or that the defendant would suffer an undue hardship. This
section shall not apply to any third party surety.
In United States v. Ware, Nos. 04 Cr. 1224 & 05 Cr. 1115, 2021 WL 3188248, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 28, 2021), one half of the bail was posted by the defendant and the other half by his mother.
Although the defendant’s mother’s portion could not be applied to the defendant’s fines by 28
U.S.C. § 2044, the defendant’s mother died during the pendency of the case. Id. at *2. The court
held that as a one-third beneficiary of the estate, one-third of the mother’s portion of the bail funds
could be applied to the defendant’s fines. Id.
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concluded.24 Although issues still arise about ownership of the funds,
once ownership is determined, a third party is protected from any loss of
bail funds.25 The system is not the same in state courts, when third-party
bonds may be applied to a defendant’s fines, court costs, or restitution
without the third party’s consent.26
State courts have provisions in statute or rule of court for the discharge
of bail when the case is concluded: to either release the funds or apply
them to court-imposed financial sanctions.27 As a contract, a bail bond
should be construed to give effect to the reasonable intentions of the parties, with the understanding that the construction should be in favor of the
surety who may not be held liable for a greater undertaking than agreed
to when bail was posted.28 Recognizing this principle, some courts have
applied contract principles when third parties post bond and agree to secure the presence of the defendant for court proceedings.29 Once the case
is over and the conditions are satisfied, the contract is completed with the
trial court, and the third party is entitled to return of the funds.30
The primary purpose of applying third-party bail funds to fines and

24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(g) (requiring court to release any bail when bond conditions have been
satisfied).
25. See United States v. Ener, 278 F. Supp. 2d 441, 449 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“[A]ny bail funds
belonging to friends and relatives were unavailable to pay the fines if an evidentiary hearing established their legitimate claim to the funds.” (citing Bridges v. United States, 588 F.2d 911, 912–13
(4th Cir. 1978))); United States v. Bracewell, 569 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that any
bail funds belonging to friends and relatives were unavailable to pay fines if an evidentiary hearing
established their legitimate claim to funds). See also Bracewell, 569 F.2d at 1200 (“If monies paid
on a defendant’s behalf actually belong to a third party, then they are not available for payment.”).
26. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 85 (2021). See also Michael G. Duprée, Annotation, Propriety of Applying Cash Bail to Payment of Fine, 42 A.L.R.5th 547 (1996) (stating
that, in some instances, statute further authorizes application of cash bail to payment of defendant's
fine or his fine and costs). Additionally, some courts have allowed the use of cash bail for payment
of fines and costs without specific statutory authority. Id.
27. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 85 (2021).
28. United States v. Sparger, 79 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (citing United States v.
Jones, 607 F.2d 687, 688 (5th Cir. 1979)). See also United States v. Arnold, No. 1-18-CR-30-1,
2020 WL 957415, at *2–3 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 2020) (following Sparger).
29. United States v. Wickenhauser, 710 F.2d 486, 487–88 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant was entitled to release of his bond because he satisfied the “condition” of his appearance in
court); United States v. Powell, 639 F.2d 224, 266 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing Jones, 607 F.2d at
688).
30. See, e.g., Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 361–62 (1971) (discussing a provision of Illinois
law which provided for return of bail funds to accused). Although the issue in Schilb involved the
authority of a clerk of court to charge a bail fee, the underlying issue was the right to retain the bail
funds after the case was terminated. Id. at 360–62. The Court upheld the bail fee but held when the
defendant is discharged from all obligations in the case, after deduction of the fee, the balance of
the bail money is required to be released. Id. at 367–68.
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court costs is to generate court revenue.31 Using courts as a revenue generator has been a long-standing problem,32 receiving national attention in
2015 following the disturbance in Ferguson, Missouri, and the subsequent pattern-or-practice investigation and report by the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ).33 This report, as well as others, found an excessive emphasis on revenue rather than public safety and a disproportionate impact
of fines on poor and minority persons.34 The DOJ’s report also found that
this emphasis on revenue generation fundamentally compromised the
role of the court to act as a neutral arbitrator.35
With the emphasis on revenue, a warrant becomes a collection tool. In
her dissenting opinion in Utah v. Strieff, Justice Sotomayor noted the
staggering increase in warrants when a person with a traffic ticket misses

31. Not all applications of bail funds by the government are to enrich the government. Often the
bail funds are applied to restitution. Considering a victim’s rights, a judge may be concerned that
the money posted as bail and the defendant’s circumstances, the bail funds may be the only source
of restitution for a crime victim. While a distinction may be made between restitution to compensate
a crime victim and fines and court costs that accrue to the government, the impact on the innocent
third party is the same.
32. See Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016),
https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/ [https://perma.cc/8P5N-A88T]; Note, Development in the Law: Policing, Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1731–32 (2015)
[hereinafter Policing and Profit] (discussing history of revenue-generating schemes by federal
agencies, from fines and fees to civil forfeiture); Matthew Shaer, How Cities Make Money by Fining
the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/magazine/cities-finepoor-jail.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer
[https://perma.cc/5GUJ-7886] (“[J]ailing poor defendants has proved to be an effective way of raising money.”).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–15
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQW3-VT34].
34. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL 1 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail
_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVK4-GRWK] (examining effects on poor defendants of common monetary payments in criminal justice systems); see also Kiren Jahangeer, Fines and Fees:
The Criminalization of Poverty, AM. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/publications/public_lawyer_articles/fees-fines/
[https://perma.cc/SJ5W-7PTK] (noting a disproportionate burden on racial minorities to account
for costs associated with incarceration); Aravind Boddupalli & Sarah Calame, Fines and Forfeitures and Racial Disparities, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/fines-and-forfeitures-and-racial-disparities [https://perma.cc/DZU2-ZUS4]
(discussing role that fines and forfeitures play in state and local government budgets).
35. The DOJ’s March 2015 report of its investigation of the Ferguson Police Department found
that officers and courts focused on generating revenue through fines and fees. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
supra note 33 at 3, 97–98. See also Mike Maciag, Skyrocketing Court Fines Are Major Revenue
Generator for Ferguson, GOVERNING (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.governing.com/archive/govferguson-missouri-court-fines-budget.html [https://perma.cc/SR55-SEF4] (noting that approximately one-fifth of total operating revenue for Ferguson’s budget came from court fines in 2013).
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a fine payment or court appearance in misdemeanor cases.36 The DOJ’s
report found, “[t]hat the primary role of warrants is not to protect public
safety but rather to facilitate fine collection is further evidenced by the
fact that the warrants issued by the court are overwhelmingly issued in
non-criminal traffic cases that would not themselves result in a penalty of
imprisonment.”37 Reasons for nonappearance or nonpayment include
lack of financial ability, lack of transportation (in many cases due to a
suspended driver’s license), inability to leave work, or fear of arrest for
nonpayment.38
The increase in warrants for minor offenses also impacts pretrial detention. The number of friends or relatives a defendant may call to post
bail is not only limited to the friend or relative’s financial situation. A
friend or relative with their own active bench warrant will be reluctant to
go to a police station to post bail for another person.39
I. BASIS FOR APPLYING THIRD-PARTY BAIL TO FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
Methods used to apply third-party bonds to a defendant’s fines or court
costs include:
Local rule of court;
A bond receipt form containing language that the third party agrees to
disposition of funds;
Local court requirements that the bond must be put in the defendant’s
name; and
Scare or coercive tactics, including
a) putting the bond in the defendant’s name by telling the third party
that if the defendant does not appear, the third party will not only
forfeit the amount of funds deposited, but will also be required to
pay the additional ninety percent balance;40 or
b) upon conviction, threatening to levy additional surcharges or other
36. See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 249–50 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Outstanding
warrants are surprisingly common. When a person with a traffic ticket misses a fine payment or
court appearance, a court will issue a warrant.”).
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 33, at 56; see also Policing and Profit, supra note 32, at
1746 (noting that people often avoid police to elude arrest for debt, rather than to hide illicit activity).
38. MATTHEW MENENDEZ ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE FEES AND FINES 10 (2019).
39. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 16-CV-130, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235938, at
*1-4 (E.D. Wis. 2018) (involving woman arrested on warrant for nonpayment of fines when posting
bail for her son).
40. With a ten percent cash bond, the person who posted the bond, whether third party or defendant, is technically liable to pay the remaining ninety percent balance if the defendant does not
appear. The general practice, however, is to forfeit the amount posted, issue a new warrant with a
new bond, and not pursue the remaining balance in a non-surety situation.
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collateral sanctions for nonpayment, including suspension of the
defendant’s driver’s license, unless the third-party bond is applied
to the fines or court costs.
Although some of these methods have been upheld, courts have noted
problems with them.
A local rule is a codification of a particular court’s practices which are
not in conflict with the state’s enacted laws or rules of practice and procedure. Ruckinger v. Weicht41 invalidated a local court rule applying
third-party bail money to fines and court costs as in conflict with the
state’s rules of procedure.42 The court in Ruckinger recognized that a
friend or parent in a stressful situation might not understand the full consequences, including loss of funds, when posting bond.43 Similarly, in
State v. Harshman,44 a bond form based on a local rule requiring a third
party to apply a bail bond to the defendant’s fines and court costs was
invalid because the third party had not given voluntary consent and had
no opportunity to dispute this term in order to post bond.45 In addition,
the local court rule the bond form was based on violated the state statute.46
The third party who posts the bond will likely have no notice of the
local rule that bail funds can be applied to any subsequent fines or court
costs.47 A local rule restricting the post-judgment distribution of bail
funds can be direct or indirect, converting bail into a performance bond
until all fines and court costs are paid. Similar to a court order, it is beyond the scope of the purpose of the bond.48
In State v. Iglesias, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a state statute
permitting bond money to be applied to fines, costs, and restitution
41. Ruckinger v. Weicht, 514 A.2d 948, 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
42. Court policies that automatically deprive a third party of return of bail funds risk exposing
a municipality to monetary damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. See Denton v. Bedinghaus, 40 F. App’x 974, 979–80 (6th Cir. 2002) (reversing dismissal of class action to determine if
quasi-judicial immunity applied to a local government entity that benefitted from court’s policy to
automatically apply third-party bonds to defendant’s child-support arrearage.).
43. Ruckinger, 514 A.2d at 951.
44. State v. Harshman, 806 N.E.2d 598, 602–04 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
45. Id.
46. See also United States v. Forte, No. 85-141-1, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22869, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa.
July 14, 1986) (holding that a local rule creating a lien in favor of government for bail was limited
to defendant’s funds and could not be applied to third parties).
47. In Perry v. Aversman, the attorneys posted the bond for the defendant and were not aware
of the local rule. 168 S.W.3d 541, 543–44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). The appellate court reversed a
judgment that the local rule was invalid because there was notice to the third party of the potential
loss of the bail funds by the language of the bond receipt. Id.
48. Cantois v. Virgin Islands, 61 V.I. 257, 260–61 (2014) (invalidating a court order making
release of bond money to third party contingent on defendant’s paying all fines and court costs);
see also State v. Austin, No. 95-CA-99, 1996 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 3061, at *1–2, *4 (July 5,
1996) (holding plain error for trial court to withhold release of bond until all fines were paid).
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without regard to the ownership of the funds.49 The court relied in part on
the printed language on the bond receipt providing any money deposited
for bail was conclusively presumed to be the defendant’s property and
could be applied to payment of the defendant’s fines or other financial
sanctions.50 While this language was not pointed out at the time the bond
was posted, the court stated that the language was clear and understandable and that the depositor signed the receipt acknowledging the terms of
the bond.51 Although upholding the language in the bond receipt, the
court recognized the hurried circumstances when a bond is posted and
suggested the language on the bond receipt should be written in large bold
letters as a matter of public policy.52 Some state statutes require the notice
of potential loss of funds to be distinguishable from the surrounding text,
in bold or underlined print, and larger than the surrounding type. 53
II. CHILLING EFFECT
The decision in Iglesias is significant for the warning the dissenting
opinion set out of the consequence of third-party bond forfeiture as payment of the defendant’s fines:54 As the dissent observed, while larger,
bold print on a bond receipt will provide adequate notice to the person
posting bond that the money can be applied to the defendant’s fines and
court costs, it may also cause a chilling effect for the third party willing
49. State v. Iglesias, 517 N.W.2d 175, 182–83 (Wis. 1994).
50. This was based on Wisconsin case law and statute permitting any money posted as bond to
be applied to fines and court costs. Specific references to state statutes are not included due to
subsequent amendment or renumbering.
51. The court in Iglesias reasoned,
The receipts were written in very understandable English (both Miller and Bochler can
read, although Bochler claims he reads only at the fifth-grade level.) Moreover, they
signed the receipts thereby acknowledging they had read them. In this case, we believe
that procedural due process was clearly satisfied by publication of the statute, the length
of time the statute has been in effect, and primarily by the notice language on the receipt
itself, which both Bochler and Miller signed.
517 N.W.2d at 184.
52. In Ellis v. Hunter, 3 So.3d 373, 377 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), the court acknowledged
a legislative change to provide that cash bonds “prominently display a notice explaining that all
funds are subject to forfeiture and withholding by the clerk of the court for the payment of court
fees . . . regardless of who posted the funds.”
53. In People v. Williams, 972 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), the court upheld the
decision applying the third party’s bond to the defendant’s fines and court costs. Although the bond
receipt did not fully comply with the statutory requirement regarding size and type of print, the
court found substantial compliance with the statute to give notice to the third party of the risk of
loss of the bail funds. Id. The third party in Williams was also advised by defense counsel that the
bond could be applied to any fines or court costs, providing additional notice to the third party. Id.
54. Iglesias, 517 N.W.2d at 185–86 (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (“Because bail is being used in
this case for purposes for which it was not intended and is thus ‘excessive,’ and because its use in
this manner will have a chilling effect upon a defendant’s constitutional rights to pretrial release, I
conclude that it is contrary to the dictates of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.”).
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to post bail for their friend or relative.55
Conspicuous notice to a third party on a bond receipt that the funds are
not returnable is a two-edged sword. The dissent warned that once a third
party realizes the posted funds may not be returned, the third party may
not be willing to post bond.56 The more prominent the notice to the third
party that he or she is not just putting up money for the release of the
defendant, but also effectively forfeiting the money to the court system,
the greater the reluctance to post bail. The third party’s relationship to the
defendant also includes personal knowledge of the defendant’s reliability
and past infractions. As such, giving adequate notice to the third party
may also prevent the bond from being posted, prolonging the defendant’s
detention solely for financial reasons.
Other courts have also recognized this chilling effect. State v.
Letscher,57 citing the dissent in Iglesias, held that disposition of pretrial
bail money is not authorized as part of a sentence, and a third-party bond
could not be applied to the fine as part of a defendant’s sentence.58 The
concurring opinion in State v. Thomas59 noted that the practice of applying third-party bonds to defendants’ financial sanctions punishes the faith
that friends and family have in the defendant and creates a disincentive
55. Although the dissent in Iglesias warned of a chilling effect on the defendant’s constitutional
rights to pretrial release by conditioning the bail as part of a later fine payment and not its intended
purpose, the policy of automatically applying the third party’s bond to the defendant’s subsequent
fines and court costs would also have a chilling effect on the person posting the bail. The chilling
effect on the third party also directly impacts the defendant’s right of pretrial release if the thirdparty bail is reluctant to post the bond. Id. at 186.
56.
In its decision, the majority suggests that the statement on the bail receipt, which warns
parties that bail money may be used for fines, be printed in large, bold letters so as to
adequately inform those parties posting bail. I completely agree that those parties should
be warned. I am concerned, however, that once third parties are made aware of the potential use of the bail money they will no longer be willing to post the bail. Indigent
people who have not yet been proven guilty, who rely on friends or relatives to post bail
so that they may be released prior to trial, will suffer.
Id.
57. State v. Letscher, 888 N.W.2d 880, 887 (Iowa 2016) (citing Iglesias, 517 N.W.2d at 186)
(Bablitch, J., dissenting)).
58. See United States v. Equere, 916 F. Supp. 450, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“If bail money belonging to third parties could regularly be applied to certain debts of defendants, there would be clear
incentives for defendants to avoid repaying debts, and clear disincentives for third parties to post
bond.”); United States v. Hall, No. MC-10-0017-PHX-FJM, 2011 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 89645, at *3
(D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2011) (“[T]hird parties will be unwilling to post bail funds that are unlikely to
be returned.”); Ruckinger v. Weicht, 514 A.2d 948, 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“If the risks are clear
to the third party, they may well serve as a basis for refusing to make the funds available to the
accused even though the third party is willing to assume the risk of the accused appearing for
trial.”).
59. State v. Thomas, 425 P.3d 437, 442 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (Egan, C.J., concurring).

452

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

to post bail for a person who clearly qualifies for bail and fully complies
with the terms of the bond.60
A third party’s reluctance to post bail delays pretrial release, often for
nonviolent offenses, when there is little or no risk of flight.61 Delay of the
defendant’s pretrial release adds to unnecessary incarceration, overcrowded jails, and public expenses for the costs of incarceration.62 In addition, there are the personal costs to the defendant, who may miss work
or school, lose a job, or be unavailable for childcare.63
III. STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP
Some states have a statutory presumption that bail funds are owned by
the defendant.64 Even when this presumption appears to be conclusive,
most statutes afford the court some discretion by providing that the court
may, rather than shall, apply the proceeds of the bond.65 When the statute
provides discretion, the court may consider the impact on and financial
condition of the third party who posted the bond.66 A rebuttable
60. Id.
61. JUST. POL’Y INST., FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING INDUSTRY
STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE 10, 19–22 (2012), https://justicepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4A2-RDPA].
62. Id. at 3; see also Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the Poor: How Money Bail
Perpetuates an Endless Cycle of Poverty and Jail Time, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 10, 2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/incomejails.html [https://perma.cc/F5CJ-NR93] (“If . . . defendant[s are] unable to come up with the money either personally or through a commercial bail
bondsman, they can be incarcerated from their arrest until their case is resolved or dismissed in
court.”).
63. With more courts adopting a nonmonetary bail schedule or policy, the number of these issues diminishes. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 117–28 (2018) (regarding the substantial, detrimental economic impact of misdemeanors on indigent defendants).
64. A distinction may be drawn between a statute, passed by the state legislature that permits a
bond to be applied to the defendant’s financial sanctions and is subject to challenge in the court,
and a local rule in which the court predetermines the disposition of bail funds.
65. Courts shall order bail funds owned by the defendant to be applied to any financial sanction
imposed on the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2044. Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of this language, courts retain discretion due to the additional language. See United States v. Shkreli, No. 15Cr.-637, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114792, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2018), aff’d, 779 F. App’x 38
(2d Cir. 2019) (“[Bail funds] cannot be imposed for the offense the defendant committed or that
the defendant would suffer an undue hardship.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2044)); see also United States
v. Hunger, No. H-05-337-02, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88928, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2008)
(finding that even though bail funds were in defendant’s name, their release to government would
impose an undue hardship on defendant and his family).
66. As it relates to the payment of court-appointed counsel, see, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/113-3.1(c) (1993):
Any sum deposited as money bond with the Clerk of the Circuit Court under Section
110-7 of this Code may be used in the court’s discretion in whole or in part to comply
with any payment order entered in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section. The
court may give special consideration to the interests of relatives or other third parties
who may have posted a money bond on the behalf of the defendant to secure his release.
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presumption provides the court even greater discretion to determine the
disposition of the funds, permitting a court to go beyond the name on a
bond receipt.
IV. ASSIGNED-COUNSEL ISSUES
Assignment of counsel is based on the defendant’s indigency.67 Assessment of assigned-counsel costs is based on the defendant’s ability to
pay.68 While both are within the discretion of the court, the bond posted
by a third party is not a determinative factor for either.
A defendant’s financially resourceful friends or family members
should not be considered when deciding if the defendant qualifies for appointed counsel in a criminal case.69 In Illinois v. MacTaggart,70 the court
held that a defendant could not be denied appointment of a public defender based solely on the bond posted by the defendant’s parents.71 The
court in MacTaggart noted, “Bail is commonly posted by friends, family,
and other supporters and the court cannot presume that the bond funds
are available to the defendant. Provisions for bail do not mandate that
funds made available by others are necessarily dedicated to the defendant’s attorney fees.”72 Unless otherwise shown, bail posted by a third
party is not an asset of the defendant and is not available for the defendant
to assign to a private attorney for representation.73 The same principle,
that third-party bail funds are not the defendant’s assets, applies equally
to prohibit applying bail funds to the defendant’s fines and court costs as
67. John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use the Federal
Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of Their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2013).
68. See United States v. Kelley, 861 F.3d 790, 800 (8th Cir. 2017),
The constitutional right to a fair trial is implicated in the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants. . . . In granting court-appointed counsel, the court assesses a defendant’s immediate ability to pay because “any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”
(first citing Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012), then quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963)).
69. See generally People v. Darnold, 33 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). The trial court
distinguished between bail being posted by the defendant as evidence of the defendant’s financial
resources and bail posted by someone else, which would not be considered in the decision to appoint counsel for the defendant. Id. at 579.
70. Illinois v. MacTaggart, 151 N.E.3d 667, 671–72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
71. See State v. Kasler, 995 N.E.2d 262, 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (reversing misdemeanor
convictions for denial of court-appointed counsel to a college-student defendant based on household income that included her parents’ income and property).
72. MacTaggart, 151 N.E.3d at 671–72.
73. See State v. West, No. A14-1630, 2015 LEXIS 609, at *16–19 (Minn. Ct. App. July 6, 2015)
(holding that bail posted by defendant’s father was not sufficient by itself to determine that defendant was ineligible for a public defender).
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it does for consideration of appointment of counsel.
This issue generally arises with misdemeanor or low-level felony offenses. If public defenders are not available, private attorneys are assigned to indigent defendants. When a third-party bond is substantial, the
defendant usually has retained counsel. Consequently, appointment of
counsel has a disproportionate impact on defendants who are at or below
the poverty level.74 While it may appear that a person with the financial
resources to post bond can also afford to hire an attorney, often the financial resources of both the defendant and his or her family or friends are
exhausted by the expense of the bail.75
Similarly, assessment of assigned-counsel fees is based on the defendant’s financial status and ability to pay.76 Assessment of counsel fees also
has a disproportionate impact on a defendant at or below the poverty
level. Court costs, which are civil in nature, when added to assessed counsel fees and other court-imposed expenses, may eclipse the fine imposed
for the offense. In light of this disproportionate impact, it is necessary to
determine the defendant’s ability to pay before assessing appointed-counsel fees.
Addressing the issue of whether a third-party security77 should be considered for appointed-counsel fees, the court in State v. Morales78 applied
a two-step process:
1) Whether the defendant has or may in the future have an ability to
pay, and if so,
2) The amount of the bond funds to be applied to court-appointed
fees.79
74. See, e.g., People v. Portillo, 616 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted):
A defendant who can afford to retain counsel on his own cannot have that right restricted
by the courts. Such a defendant has a constitutional right to defend an action through the
attorney of his choice. In contrast, an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment
of counsel, but he does not have the right to have counsel of his choosing appointed.
75. See People v. Falls, 2020 IL App (1st) 170219-U, ⁋⁋ 25, 27–28 (holding that trial court’s
decision to deny appointment of counsel to defendant based on defendant’s ability to post bond,
even though funds were put up by a third party, was reversible error).
76. See Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their
Court-Appointed Counsel through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323,
335–36 (2009) (detailing widespread state-court practice, authorized under Fuller v. Oregon, 417
U.S. 40 (1974), of requiring defendants for whom counsel is appointed to contribute toward cost of
their representation if it can subsequently be demonstrated that they have ability to pay, and reviewing several methods of determining that ability).
77. Oregon uses the term security instead of bond or bail.
78. See generally State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954 (Or. 2020).
79. Id. at 957. The Oregon statute permitted the court to apply any bond to the defendant’s
court-imposed financial obligations. Id. In addition, the bond receipt in this case gave written notice
to the defendant’s mother who posted the security that the funds could be applied to the defendant’s
court-imposed financial sanctions. Id. at 956.
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The court in Morales explained that if there is no ability to pay, the process ends without determining any costs or other fees imposed on the defendant.80 Until the trial court determines the defendant has the ability to
pay, the court cannot assess assigned-counsel fees. Funds owned by a
third party may be available for paying court-ordered expenses, but only
after the defendant’s ability to pay is determined. A trial court cannot
consider a third-party bond as part of the defendant’s financial resources
for purposes of determining the defendant’s ability to pay unless there is
some evidence that the third-party family member or friend intended to
transfer the funds to the defendant.81
The court in Morales distinguished between a spouse as the third party
paying the security, which may be part of the defendant’s financial resources, and a non-spouse whose funds (in the absence of a donative intent) are not part of the defendant’s financial resources.82 When, however,
the defendant has jointly owned property or an interest in a business venture with another family member, the value of the property and the extent
of the defendant’s interest may be considered when determining defendant’s ability to pay assigned-counsel fees.83
Most states, whether by statute or case law, require the trial court to
make a finding on the defendant’s financial situation and resources before
assessing assigned-counsel fees.84 Providing the defendant with a
80.
Thus, before imposing fees, the trial court must complete a two-step process . . . . It
appears to follow necessarily from the text of the statute that, if a trial court is unable to
find that the defendant “is or may be able to pay” the fees—or, to phrase it in the affirmative, if the trial court finds that the defendant does not have the ability to pay—the
inquiry ends, and the court may not impose fees in any amount.
Id.
81.
When funds deposited by a third party nevertheless belong to a defendant, they may be
used to satisfy the defendant’s financial obligations. Without the presumption that security funds belong to a defendant, however, funds paid by and belonging to a third party
cannot be the sole basis for a finding that a defendant has the “ability to pay” courtordered costs.
Id. at 961.
82. See id. (discussing scrutiny of security deposit made by a defendant’s spouse versus a nonspouse third party such as another family member who probably had no donative intent); see also
State v. Scott, 488 P.3d 803, 807–08 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (applying Morales and reversing order to
defendant to reimburse assigned-counsel fees based on bail posted by defendant’s mother).
83. United States v. Konrad, 730 F.3d 343, 349–50 (3d Cir. 2013).
84. See Anderson, supra note 76, at 340 (“Not all jurisdictions determine the defendant’s ability
to pay before imposing recoupment.”); see also People v. Henderson, 596 N.E.2d 837, 842 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (recognizing that state law mandates a hearing on reasonableness of attorney fees
for court-appointed counsel, where court must consider defendant’s financial circumstances to determine if recoupment is appropriate).
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meaningful right to be heard when determining his or her ability to pay is
essential to avoid assessing additional expenses to indigent defendants.
In People v. Webb, the court held that a hearing was required before a
third-party bond could be applied to assigned-counsel fees.85 When someone other than the defendant posted the bond, the third party was entitled
to notice and the right to be heard before the bond was applied to any
court-ordered fees.86 Although a trial court may consider the financial
impact on the third party when deciding if the bond should be applied to
court fees or returned to the third party, this decision is not made until
after the trial court determines the defendant’s ability to pay.
Following the decision in Webb, Illinois courts require a hearing before
bonds may be applied to assigned counsel fees.87 Moreover, because an
order to apply the bond constituted forfeiture, the defendant does not
waive the right to assert this error on appeal by failing to object in the
trial court to a failure to follow procedural requirements. 88
The court in Webb noted that the ability to post bond does not create a
presumption the defendant has the ability to pay appointed-counsel fees.89
This presumption violates due process by discriminating against indigent
defendants who posted bond. It also violates the right of procedural due
process by effectively denying the opportunity to present evidence of the
defendant’s financial condition.
V. ISSUE OF STANDING
Generally, although not a party in a criminal case, a third party has
standing in the case to request the return of bail posted at the conclusion
of the case. The person who posted the bail suffers an injury and acquires
85. People v. Webb, 658 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
86.
The form informs third party payers only that bail may be forfeited and used for attorney
fees if the defendant fails to comply with the conditions of the bail bond. Thus, where,
as here, a defendant complies with the conditions, there is no reasonable notice that the
public defender’s services may be paid for out of the bond deposit.
Id. at 856.
87. See People v. Love, 687 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ill. 1997) (“The hearing required by section 1133.1 is a safeguard designed to insure [sic] that a reimbursement order entered under that section
meets constitutional standards, as identified by this court in Cook.”). The holding was subsequently
adopted and codified as state law. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3.1.
88. See Love, 687 N.E.2d at 39 (affirming appellate court’s judgment vacating trial court’s reimbursement order, despite defendant’s failure to object at trial); see also People v. Simmons, 2014
IL App (1st) 123225-U, ¶ 13 (holding that forfeiture is inappropriate without a procedural inquiry);
People v. Carreon, 960 N.E.2d 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that fee must be vacated where trial
court fails to follow appropriate procedural requirements, even if defendant did not raise issue in
trial court).
89. Webb, 658 N.E.2d at 854; see also People v. Cook, 407 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ill. 1980) (explaining
that court has never adopted a presumption that an ability to post bail indicates ability to pay counsel); see generally Love, 687 N.E.2d at 39 (citing Cook, 407 N.E.2d at 59).
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standing by the loss of funds.90 The third party’s ability to assert their
rights in court for return of the bail funds not only is grounded in due
process, but also preserves the viability of the bail system by permitting
a third party to deposit bail funds with the court with the understanding
that the court will provide a forum for the third party. 91 A trial court has
ancillary jurisdiction to consider a third party’s motion for release of bail
and to consider and determine ownership of the funds.92 The third party’s
standing continues for appellate review.93
The right to assert a claim, however, is only one obstacle facing the
third party who is attempting to recover the funds. When substantial funds
are at issue, all persons asserting an interest in the funds will generally be
represented by counsel.94 In many misdemeanor or other low-level offenses, the person requesting the return of the bond is often pro se. The
third party does not have an attorney or the right to appointed counsel,
like the defendant does, and may not know the proper procedure to challenge a court order applying the bond to the defendant’s fines or court
costs.
In some cases, a direct appeal is not available because the third party
is not a party in the criminal case and did not file a motion for return of
bail funds, raise an objection to the release or application of the funds, or
make any appearance in the case. In other situations, either the third party
may be unaware of the right to appeal, or the appeal time has lapsed. The
only remaining remedy is a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition against
the judge who ordered the payment of the bond to fines or court costs.
90. See Watanmaker v. Clark, No. 09-CV-3877, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89958, at *15
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010) (finding third-party payor had standing to challenge bail forfeiture); People v. Courturier, No. 252175, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 3145, at *14 (Dec. 15, 2005) (per curiam)
(holding that only third party who posted bail, not defendant, had standing to assert claim for release
of funds). But see Coleman v. Cnty. of Kane, 196 F.R.D. 505, 507 (N.D. Ill. 2000). The plaintiff
sought to certify a class-action lawsuit against the county sheriff for additional fees charged for and
deducted from the bail amount. Id. The defendant sought to deny class certification on the grounds
of lack of standing because a third party, not the plaintiff, had posted the plaintiff’s bail. Id. Dismissing this argument as “silly,” the trial court noted that the plaintiff incurred injury as the additional fee was owed by the plaintiff as part of the funds advanced by the third party. Id.
91. See United States v. Rubenstein, 971 F.2d 288, 295 (9th Cir. 1992) (articulating court’s
interest preserving bail fund system by assuring third-party payor of forum to petition for release
of funds).
92. See United States v. Ener, 278 F. Supp. 2d 441, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (stating that third party
motions are ancillary to determine where to release bail funds); see also United States v. Arnaiz,
842 F.2d 217, 224 (9th Cir. 1988) (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (“[A] bail bond is property in the
possession of the federal court, and even if express jurisdiction is otherwise lacking, ancillary jurisdiction may properly be invoked for disputes involving it.”).
93. See generally In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 531 N.W.2d 806 (1995).
94. See, e.g., People v. Love, 687 N.E.2d 32, 38 (Ill. 1997) (noting that third party who had
posted bond obtained counsel prior to trial to get her money back).
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Mandamus, often misunderstood even by attorneys, imposes an almost
impossible barrier for pro se litigants.95
Appellate review, either by direct appeal or through mandamus and/or
prohibition proceedings, is confusing, cumbersome, costly, and effectively unavailable to a third party without legal assistance. The cost of
pursuing either remedy will most often exceed the amount of the funds
involved.96 Although the third party may ultimately recover the funds,
both time and additional expenses are incurred.97
Moreover, as a direct action against the trial judge, a mandamus proceeding creates an adversarial relationship with the trial court, undermining the appearance of the trial court as the neutral arbitrator. The trial
judge, not the prosecutor or other person claiming an interest in the bail
funds, is effectively put into a position to dispute the ownership and disposition of the bond claimed by the third party. As the person who controls the distribution of the funds, the judge functions as the respondent
in the writ proceeding, which implies an individual interest in the outcome. It also reinforces an unfortunate public image of the judge as concerned with generating revenue by imposing and collecting fines, regardless of the source of the funds.98

95. Mandamus is a limited remedy which cannot be used to compel a judge to exercise discretion but is only available when the judge declines to exercise discretion or take any action when
there is proper subject matter jurisdiction. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384–
85 (1953). Neither mandamus nor prohibition may be used as a substitute for a direct appeal. Thus,
when a judge has discretion over how bail funds may be disbursed or applied, mandamus is not
available. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 248–49 (1932); Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277,
288 (1895).
96. In State ex rel. Jennings v. Montgomery, No. 98222, 2012 WL 2584863, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 2, 2012), the third party was required to file a mandamus proceeding against the judge
who applied the third-party bond to fines. This case involved a court policy to automatically apply
all bonds to fines and costs. Id. The proceeding was dismissed after the trial court vacated its entry
and refunded the bond to the third party without addressing the court’s policy. Id. at *1–2.
97. The small amount of funds at issue, especially with a cash bond in a misdemeanor offense,
explains the low number of appellate cases over the years. Although this is an ongoing and recurring
problem, in many cases the small amount of money involved makes it economically unfeasible to
obtain appellate review.
98. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 33, at 42–61, 100 (questioning Ferguson municipal court’s excessive fines and collection enforcement practices and recommending the court stop
using arrest warrants as means of collecting fees); see also, Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446, 448 (5th
Cir. 2019) (finding that trial judge’s practices in collecting criminal fines and fees, a portion of
which went directly into a judicial expense fund to pay court personnel salaries, violated Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Regarding the possible conflict of interest from a judge occupying a dual role, the court in Cain relied on Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), recognizing the
appearance of impropriety when there is a possible temptation to the average man as judge due to
a financial interest in the outcome of a case. 937 F.3d at 451. In Cain, the court found that the
standard of review was an average man as a judge, not an average judge. Id. at 453.
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VI. IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL THIRD PARTY
The obvious and direct impact on a third party is the loss of funds. The
third party may consider bail a short-term loan, safe on deposit with the
court, and may be relying on it to pay for rent, mortgage, a car payment,
or utility bills. Instead, the short-term loan turns into a mandated payment
of fines for someone else’s misdeeds. Bail funds are limited to the agreement to secure the defendant’s appearance and should not impose a
greater liability on the third party than when the bond was posted.99 As
the court noted in United States v. Equere,
If bail money belonging to third parties could regularly be applied to
certain debts of the defendants, there would be clear incentives for defendants to avoid repaying debts, and clear disincentives for third parties to post bond. To avert such harms, the use of a third party’s bail
money should be limited to its core purpose—to secure a defendant’s
appearance in court. Once such purpose is satisfied, a third party’s
money should be promptly returned.100

If there is no voluntary reimbursement by the defendant, the third
party’s recourse is generally limited to a small-claims or other separate
civil action against the defendant to recover the funds.101 Ironically, a defendant convicted of a criminal offense has more protection than the third
party who posted the bail. Regarding immediate payment, a defendant
can raise an issue of ability to pay, which is not available to an innocent
third party who posted the bond. If a defendant is financially unable to
pay at the time the fine is imposed, arrangements can be made through a
payment plan.102 The third party does not have that option, as the entire
amount is lost.
Beyond the criminal context, a third party’s bond also has less protection than a civil judgment. With a civil bank account attachment, there is
a right to object to the seizure of the funds with statutory exemptions and

99. United States v. Sparger, 79 F. Supp. 2d 714, 7118 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (“[I]f the defendant
satisfied the conditions of the bond . . . then it was mandatory that the courts exonerate the obligors
and release any bail.”).
100. 916 F. Supp. 450, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (affirming bail was posted by defendant’s brother).
101. Small-claims cases are generally informal proceedings with no right to pretrial discovery
or jury trial. Rosse v. DeSoto Cab Co., 34 Cal. App. 4th. 1047, 1052 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Procedural rules may be relaxed and limited monetary damages. Even though this procedure is available
for a third party to seek to recover from the defendant the money advanced for bail, the third party
may be unaware of the process or disillusioned, having already been frustrated in prior attempts to
recover the bail funds directly from the court.
102. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3.1 (explaining that method of payment may be modified
in interests of justice).
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monetary limitations of the amount that can be attached.103 A third-party
bond, however, is an automatic seizure of the third party’s asset.104 It also
raises due-process issues by effectively imposing forfeiture without an
opportunity to be heard and assert any ownership claim.
States that have enacted a strong policy for victim’s rights, such as
Marsy’s Laws, provide notice of trial or plea, as well as the sentencing
date to the victim.105 Notice to the third party, however, is not statutorily
mandated and often random and inconsistent, if given at all. Forcing the
third party to forfeit bond for restitution replaces one victim with another.106
A. Impact on Nonprofit Community Bail Fund Organizations
Nonprofit bail organizations have become an important part of the
criminal justice system in the United States.107 Outside intervention to
address pretrial detention of people who could not afford bail can be
traced back to the Vera Institute of Justice and the Manhattan Bail Project
in 1961.108 Nonprofit bail organizations have developed and increased
over the years primarily to provide bail funds for pretrial release of indigent defendants.109
Unlike a commercial bondsman, there is often no charge to the defendant.110 Many cases involve misdemeanor or other low-level charges and
a high likelihood that the defendant will appear in court and comply with
103. See, e.g., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 447 §§ 6–7 (outlining some federal and state statutory exemptions).
104. PAUL S. WALLACE, JR., CONG. RSCH. SERV., CRIME AND FORFEITURE: THE INNOCENT
THIRD PARTY CRS-5 (1999).
105. See What is Marsy’s Law?, MARSY’S L., https://www.marsyslaw.us/what_is_marsys_law
[https://perma.cc/CS9N-Q4ZU] (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (codifying victims’ rights in criminal
proceedings).
106. Commonwealth v. Rose, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 505, 515, 2002 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. LEXIS 191,
at *13 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2002).
107. Alysia Santo, Bail Reformers Aren't Waiting for Bail Reform, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug.
23, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/23/bail-reformers-aren-t-waiting-for-bailreform [https://perma.cc/UT4V-ST5X].
108. Manhattan Bail Project, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/publications/
manhattan-bail-project-official-court-transcripts-october-1961-june-1962 [https://perma.cc/PKE29T3T] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
109. Chelsea Dennis, Bail Projects Proliferate––But Their Aim Is Reform, Not Growth, NPQ
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/bail-projects-proliferate-but-their-aim-is-reformnot-growth/ [https://perma.cc/NNP8-86H6]; Robin Steinberg et al., Freedom Should Be Free, THE
BAIL PROJECT, https://bailproject.org/freedom-should-be-free/ [https://perma.cc/VU7D-NT3F]
(last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (discussing different bail funds over the years).
110. See Need Help Paying Bail?, THE BAIL PROJECT, https://bailproject.org/help/
[https://perma.cc/C72N-U369] (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (“The Bail Project is a nonprofit organization. We pay bail for people in need at no cost to them or their loved ones. . . . Our services are
free of charge. If you receive an inquiry from someone claiming to be from The Bail Project and
asking for money to pay bail for you or your loved one, please do not send any money.”).
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any conditions of pretrial release.111 The amount of the bond has already
been set by court order or bail schedule, and the defendant’s financial
resources are the only obstacle to release. If the defendant qualifies under
the terms of the program, the money is posted by the nonprofit organization and the defendant is released.112
Nonprofit bail organizations provide a valuable service by not only reducing the jail population and pretrial detention time for indigent defendants, but also affording security for defendants’ appearance in court.113 In
addition, organizations’ screening processes provide family and employment contacts and other information that may not be available to the
court.114
Many of these nonprofit organizations raise funds primarily through
personal donations, corporate contributions, or grants.115 The money is
collected from donors to create a pool of funds available to post bail for
indigent criminal defendants. The nonprofit organization accepts and reviews referrals and evaluates each case for eligibility. There is often no
direct tie with the defendant.116 A nonprofit bail organization operates

111. O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147, 154 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The court’s review of reams
of empirical data suggested . . . that ‘release on secured financial conditions does not assure better
rates of appearance or of law-abiding conduct before trial compared to release on unsecured bonds
or nonfinancial conditions of supervision.’”); see also Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1363
(N.D. Ala. 2018) (“95% of nearly 2,300 criminal defendants whose bail was paid by charitable
organizations, i.e. who had no ‘skin in the game,’ made all court appearances.”).
112. Our Approach, THE BAIL PROJECT, https://bailproject.org/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/
ZWA2-6R95] (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (“If eligible for our program, we post bail directly to the
court at no cost to the person or their family.”).
113. United States v. Powell, 639 F.2d 224, 225 (5th Cir. 1981); see also STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at § 10-1.7.
114. Our Approach, supra note 112 (“Once someone is referred to The Bail Project, a member
of our staff will schedule an interview to learn more about the person’s situation and needs.”); see
also id. (“Once free, we support them in coming back to court and we work with local partners to
provide wrap-around services if needed.”).
115. Andrea Clisura, None of Their Business: The Need for Another Alternative to New York’s
Bail Bond Business, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 307, 336–37 (2010); see also John F. Duffy & Richard M.
Hynes, Asymmetric Subsidies and the Bail Crisis, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285, 1322 (2021) (“The Bail
Project and others are organized as 501(c)(3) organizations so that their donors can deduct donations from taxable income.”).
116. Some courts have raised issues about the lack of ties between the defendant and the nonprofit organization when setting bail. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 131 N.Y.S.3d 810, 812 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2020) (rejecting bond payment attempted by unincorporated association from Twitter solicitations with no direct relationship to defendant or his family). The court in Robinson noted neither the defendant nor his family would suffer any economic harm or be motivated to return to
court. Without the trust and reliance of a friend or relative or the loss of additional funds to a
bondsman, the court noted the defendant had “no skin in the game” as an incentive to appear in
court. Id. at 817.
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with a revolving fund that permits numerous defendants to be released
from jail by recycling the bail money after the case is concluded. The
continued operation and success of the nonprofit bail organization is dependent upon its ability to regain the funds after a defendant has been
discharged and then apply them to other defendants.117
Diverting bail money to pay a defendant’s fines or court costs undermines the entire nature of the nonprofit organization’s operation. The defendant has no ownership interest in the funds.118 The bail funds are
posted with a singular purpose: to obtain the pretrial release of the defendant.119 There is no intention for the funds to be used to pay any future
fine or court cost.
The impact of the loss of bail funds was clearly laid out in Nashville
Community Bail Fund v. Gentry.120 The nonprofit bail organization
Similarly, in United States v. Martinez-Tomas, No. 19-cr-4847-LAB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79796, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2020), the court declined a proposed bond by a nonprofit bail organization because the defendant had no connections or loyalty to the organization and little incentive not to abscond once the bond was posted. See also United States v. Martinez-Espinoza, No.
20-CR-0775-H, 2020 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 93213, at *10 n.3 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2020) (raising without deciding adequacy of a bond posted by a third-party organization with no ties to defendant).
117. Steinberg et al., supra note 109 (“Because bail is returned at the end of a case, donations
to The Bail Project National Revolving Bail Fund can be recycled and reused to pay bail two to
three times per year, maximizing the impact of every dollar.”).
118. State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954, 961 (Or. 2020) (noting bail posted by nonprofit organization could not be considered a factor in a court’s determination of a defendant’s ability to pay
assigned counsel fees.).
119. See, e.g., CHI. CMTY. BOND FUND, https://chicagobond.org/the-revolving-fund#criteria
[https://perma.cc/L8VY-AJKV] (last visited Dec. 27, 2021) (“Any money raised by CCBF that is
not used to post bond will become part of CCBF’s revolving bond fund and will be used to post
bond for others in the future. In general, CCBF will only begin an action-specific fundraising campaign after it is clear that bond will be needed. CCBF feels it is important for the integrity of bond
fundraising that asks for bond money be used to pay bond.”); THE BAIL PROJECT, https://bailproject.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/3MDM-CGWT] (last visited Dec. 27, 2021) (“Because bail is returned at the end of a case, The Bail Project National Revolving Bail Fund can be recycled and
reused to pay bail two to three times per year, maximizing the impact of every dollar. 100% of
online donations are used to bring people home.”); see also Ariel Bibby, Note, No Money, More
Problems: The Model Rules and Bail Assistance Funds, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 382–83
(2014) (“The Bronx Freedom Fund derives most of the money that it uses from donations and
grants. Then the funds are recycled back into the organization as the clients are no longer in need
of them, and they have a very low rate of forfeit.”); see generally C. Chisolm Allenlundy, Note,
Democratizing Bail: Can Bail Nullification Rehabilitate the Eighth Amendment?, 71 ALA. L. REV.
575 (2019).
120. 446 F. Supp. 3d 282 (M.D. Tenn. 2020). There are two separate district court decisions in
Nashville Cmty. Bail Fund v. Gentry. The first decision, (Gentry I) cited above, was issued on
March 17, 2020, on a motion for a preliminary injunction that was granted in part and denied in
part. Id. at 286–87. The court limited the scope of the preliminary injunction to cases when the
nonprofit plaintiff, NCBF, posted or will post bail, recognizing the hardship to the nonprofit plaintiff and the public interest in the nonprofit plaintiff’s continued operation. The court did not extend
the preliminary injunction to all third parties due to the early stage of the litigation and the scope
of the motion. Id. at 305. The second decision, Gentry II, 496 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (M.D. Tenn. 2020),
was on the defendant clerk’s motion to dismiss, which was denied. Id. at 1117.
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challenged a local court rule applying the organization’s bail funds to a
defendant’s fines and court costs.121 Although nonprofit bail organizations were initially exempted, the local rule was amended in May 2019
to allow bail posted by nonprofit organizations to be applied to fines and
court costs at the conclusion of the defendant’s case.122
The clerk of court in Gentry prepared a bond receipt form that informed the person posting the bail that the funds were subject to payment
of any fines, court costs, or restitution before release to the person posting
the bond, regardless of whether it was posted by the defendant or a third
party.123 The bond receipt language was mandatory, and bail could not be
posted or the defendant released until the receipt was signed by the depositor, acknowledging that some or all of the bail was subject to any
payment for the defendant’s subsequently imposed financial sanctions.124
The nonprofit bail fund organization in Gentry sought declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief in its own right as well as on behalf of
criminal defendants who had no other source for bail.125 Overruling the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that at the preliminary
stage of the case, the plaintiff had standing in its own right as well as on
behalf of criminal defendants who would otherwise not be able to post
bond.126
Regarding the standing issue, the court in Gentry found that the nonprofit organization incurred direct economic injury by the policy of withholding the bail funds owned by the nonprofit organization.127 Without
an opportunity to dispute the loss of the bail funds to a defendant’s fines
or court costs, the plaintiff’s complaint raised a claim for deprivation of
property without due process of law.128
121. Gentry I, 446 F. Supp. 3d at 291.
122. Id. (“[T]he Criminal Court’s local rules include a provision . . . stating that ‘[a]ny individual who desires to deposit a cash bond with the Clerk . . . shall be notified in writing by the Clerk
that such cash deposit shall be returned subject to any fines, court costs, or restitution as ordered
by the Court.’ . . . [This rule] extends the garnishment policy to bail set by third parties, including
NCBF, which poses an obstacle to NCBF’s revolving fiscal model.”).
123. Id. at 292.
124. Id. (“Bail amounts are paid through the Clerk of the Criminal Court . . . . [T]he office will
no longer accept NCBF’s payments unless the NCBF representative making the payment signs the
office’s notification form acknowledging that the bail amounts will be applied to fines, fees, costs,
taxes, or restitution.”).
125. Id. at 293.
126. Id. at 301. Only the clerk of court, not the state court judges, was named as a defendant in
the case.
127. Id. at 304.
128. Id. at 293. The defendant clerk disputed the ownership of the bail funds under state law
that only the defendant could post cash bail, and therefore, the defendant was presumed the owner
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Ironically, the nonprofit organization’s loss of available bail funds may
be more costly to the government than any funds that could be applied to
fines and fees. Depletion of available bail funds means longer pretrial
detention periods.129 Putting aside any constitutional issues, from an economic standpoint the government ends up spending more money to house
a prisoner who cannot post even a moderate bail, especially if there are
mental health, substance abuse, or medical issues which substantially increase the costs of incarceration.130 Moreover, a policy to hold the bail
funds for fines and court costs creates a misleading view of revenue generated by the court.131 A court’s revenues do not reveal the true costs of
prolonged pretrial detention and other expenses, which typically are
borne by police or a corrections department, rather than being absorbed
into the courts’ budget.132
The loss of recyclable bail funds also impacts the continued level and
solicitation methods for incoming contributions when diverted to fines
and court costs instead of pretrial release of other defendants. The Bail
Project National Revolving Bail Fund, which serves fourteen states, advertises “100% of online donations are used to bring people home and
will be recycled for someone else when their case closes.”133 The Vera
Institute of Justice, serving forty states, reported that eighty-seven percent

of the funds. Id. at 292–93. The court in Gentry II noted that this position was contrary to the clerk’s
own form which was not limited to the defendant. 496 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1138 (M.D. Tenn. 2020).
The court’s ruling on the issue of standing was based on the pleadings at this preliminary stage,
without consideration of factual findings that may be determined at a later stage in the litigation.
129. Santo, supra note 107. Using the bail to pay the court fees and fines impedes the recycling
of the nonprofit bail organizations resources. They have to seek more donations or they will have
to shut down once the court has taken all its funds. See, e.g., Gentry I, 446 F. Supp. 3d at 291 (“In
order to fund its efforts, NCBF relies on . . . ‘a revolving fund of donated money.’ . . . Accordingly,
a single donation of $1,000, for example, can be used over and over again to secure pretrial release
for a series of defendants with $1,000 bail amounts.”).
130. Total Cost of Pretrial Detention Estimated at Up to $140 Billion Annually, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jan/31/total-cost-pretrial-detention-estimated-140-billion-annually/ [https://perma.cc/68S6-2EPP]. According to reports,
U.S. taxpayers “spend approximately $38 million per day to jail people who are awaiting
trial . . . .” Researchers recognized that the actual cost could be considerably higher,
given that they used a conservative estimate for incarceration expenses of $85 per day—
which includes food, medical care and security costs. “It is 60%–100% more expensive
to jail people who have health, mental health, or substance abuse disorders,” they wrote.
Id.
131. See, e.g., Analysis of Court Fines and Fees as Government Revenue Shows High Costs,
Inefficiency, Waste, ARNOLD VENTURES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.arnoldventures.org/
newsroom/analysis-of-court-fines-and-fees-as-government-revenue-shows-high-costs-inefficiency-waste [https://perma.cc/RP29-WQ27]; see also Maciag, supra note 35.
132. Menendez et al., supra note 38, at 5 (noting that true collection costs for imposing, collecting, and enforcing criminal fees and fines are spread across different agencies and levels of government and are not readily ascertained).
133. THE BAIL PROJECT, supra note 110.
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of its 2020 funding came from local, state, and federal government.134
Applying these funds to a defendant’s fines and court costs is little more
than a diversion of funds from one governmental entity to another
through the bail system.
B. Impact on Defendant
There is a larger and more significant issue than the loss of a third
party’s bond. There is a moral issue raised when a defendant is permitted
to escape responsibility because someone else has been legally required
to pay the defendant’s fine. Enumerated statutory sentencing principles
are intended to protect the public by deterring the defendant’s future misconduct and rehabilitating and/or punishing the offender.135 The basic
concept of requiring someone else to pay a defendant’s fine subverts justice and defeats each of these purposes. There is no financial impact on
the defendant, which undermines the fundamental purpose of a financial
penalty to correct past misconduct.136 If one of the goals of punishment
is deterrence, that goal is defeated by imposing responsibility for the offense on someone other than the defendant.
A fine, as the lowest penalty, is often appropriate for minor infractions
to impress on a defendant that the conduct is not permitted and, hopefully,
will not be repeated.137 With a minor or unclassified misdemeanor

134. VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 108.
135. VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENT’G PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2010),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZS9-2MCS] (“In recent decades, sentencing policy initiatives have often been enacted with the goal of enhancing the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system.”).
136. Fines originated as a voluntary sum paid to the English Crown to avoid an indefinite prison
sentence for a common-law crime. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 287–89 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The basic concept was a penalty other than
incarceration. Over time the voluntary nature of a fine was eliminated, and a monetary sum would
be required instead of an indefinite sentence, and eventually, moving to the current system of a fine
as a separate penalty for a criminal offense. Id.
137. See R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the
Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1780 (2015) (citing as a purpose for the
rising use of criminal fines “the increasing need for intermediate sanctions” greater than probation
but less severe than incarceration).
The purpose of the imposition of a fine is to maintain a standard of conduct, which the
experience of a people has judged to be in the best interest of their particular civilization,
and it follows from that, that the imposing of a fine is to maintain the peace and dignity
of the state . . . and the maintenance of that standard of conduct which the state has
decreed to be its normal standard.
Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Reynolds, 30 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 550, 555 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1933).
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offense, a fine is generally the only available penalty.138 For more serious
misdemeanors and felonies, a fine may be an effective tool to impose
some impact on a defendant, while other, more severe penalties, such as
house arrest or actual incarceration, are suspended as a means of keeping
the defendant in line and obtaining compliance with probation.139
In many states, community work service may be substituted for a
fine.140 This policy recognizes the need to impose consequences that exert
an impact on the wrongdoer and to balance the consequences with the
defendant’s financial status to determine an appropriate sentence for the
offense. The basic principle, however, whether it is a fine or community
work service, is that the punishment is imposed on the person guilty of
the criminal act, not on a third party. A court could not require someone
else to perform the defendant’s community service obligation, and the
same should apply to the payment of fines.
A court policy or procedure requiring a third party to pay the fine in
whole or in part is also inconsistent with the public policy against shielding wrongdoers from responsibility for their own misconduct.141 The bail,
posted to secure the release of the defendant, is effectively transformed
to protect the defendant from the impact of any financial sanctions. Similar to prohibition of insurance coverage for punitive damages, but
grounded on the same principle, the court in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty stated,
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a
freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions
against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy.142

This public policy interest is inconsistent with a system requiring a third
138. State v. Sanders, 752 N.W.2d 713, 730 n.6 (Wis. 2008) (recognizing classification of misdemeanors with no potential imprisonment in Ohio, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Texas,
and Virginia).
139. See generally U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/alternatives/20150617_Alternatives.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W3YJ-GWP3].
140. See, e.g., Wichita v. Lucero, 874 P.2d 1144, 1150 (Kan. 1994) (permitting a court to order
community service in lieu of a fine upon finding defendant is indigent and unable to pay fine); State
v. Lutgen, 606 N.W.2d 312, 314 (Iowa 2000) (stating that trial court has authority to convert fines
to community service hours upon a finding that community service work will be adequate to deter
defendant and to discourage others from similar criminal activity). See also Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Taking It to the Streets, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 188 (2004) (describing program
in King County, Washington, where court may withdraw fines from collections process and convert
to community service); Ruback, supra note 136, at 1833–34 (noting Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing’s recommendation to replace fines with community service hours).
141. See generally Ruback, supra note 136.
142. 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962). Similarly, a trust fund set up to pay fines for criminal
offenses is invalid. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62, cmt. b (1959).
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party to pay the defendant’s fine from the third party’s bail money.
Although a defendant will obviously benefit from a fine paid by someone else, it can also work to the defendant’s detriment. When a court includes the amount of the third-party bond, in which the defendant has no
financial interest, a higher fine may be imposed to the prejudice of the
defendant.143 Similar to when a court improperly considers a third party’s
bail money when determining if the defendant is entitled to court-appointed counsel, the third-party bond is a misleading factor for the court
to consider in calculating any financial sanction imposed on the defendant. Two critical factors to consider when imposing a fine are the impact
on the defendant and the defendant’s financial ability to pay.144 The thirdparty bond does not fit into either of these factors. It is not an asset available to the defendant and does not accurately show the defendant’s ability
to pay a fine, whether at the time the fine is imposed or subsequent, postjudgment collection proceedings.145 If the amount of the third-party bond
143. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954, 961 (Or. 2020) (discussing how consideration of
third-party resources may lead to a mistaken belief about defendant’s ability to pay or amount they
can pay).
144. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(d) (2021)
Fines for individual defendants: In determining the amount of the fine, the court shall consider:
(1) the need for the combined sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense (including
the harm or loss to the victim and the gain to the defendant), to promote respect for the
law, to provide just punishment and to afford adequate deterrence;
(2) any evidence presented as to the defendant’s ability to pay the fine (including the
ability to pay over a period of time) in light of his earning capacity and financial resources;
(3) the burden that the fine places on the defendant and his dependents relative to alternative punishments;
(4) any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is obligated to make;
(5) any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from
the defendant’s conduct;
(6) whether the defendant previously has been fined for a similar offense;
(7) the expected costs to the government of any term of probation, or term of imprisonment and term of supervised release imposed; and
(8) any other pertinent equitable considerations.
The amount of the fine should always be sufficient to ensure that the fine, taken together with
other sanctions imposed, is punitive.
State courts also have varied and overlapping required sentencing factors and guidelines. See
NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 1 (2008) (comparing states’ sentencing practices); Kelly Lyn
Mitchell, State Sentencing Guidelines: A Garden Full of Variety, FED. PROB., Sept. 2017, at 28, 28
(“[T]he federal guidelines are just one system among many.”).
145. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664 (1982) (requiring courts to be sensitive to treatment
of indigents in criminal justice system and avoid imposing penalties on criminal defendants due to
an inability to pay fines or other financial sanctions); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689–91
(2019) (applying Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive fines to states and imposing limits
on court’s power to impose fines).
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is considered as a source of payment of a fine or court costs, however, it
may influence the financial sanction imposed.146
Regardless of its source, the defendant’s ability to post a bond may not
provide the court with an accurate assessment of the defendant’s financial
condition. To begin with, the defendant’s financial condition may have
negatively changed since the bond was posted. In addition, funds borrowed from a friend or relative without any ownership interest by the defendant are not relevant to either the intended purpose of the fine or the
defendant’s ability to pay. Moreover, if the bond is considered as a source
of payment, it may result in an unduly harsh or excessive fine if the bail
money is released to the third party and not applied to the fine.
C. Competing Claims
The primary focus of the right to the third party’s bond is the ownership of the funds. Determining ownership is not always straightforward
and is not based solely on the name on the bond receipt. The name on the
bond receipt is one factor to consider but is not determinative in light of
other evidence, especially if the third party was required to put the bond
in the defendant’s name.147
If the defendant is found guilty and a fine or other financial sanction
imposed, competing claims for the bail funds may be asserted by the defendant, the family or friend who posted the bond or supplied the funds,
and/or the government. Claims by the government include payment of
fines and court costs or restitution on behalf of a crime victim. Other
claimants may include defense attorneys,148 civil judgment creditors,149
146. On the other hand, the court’s knowledge that the defendant could not have secured pretrial
release without the financial assistance of someone else is relevant when deciding the appropriate
fine from the available range for that criminal offense. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra 144, §
5E1.2 cmt. n.3 (“The inability of a defendant to post bail bond (having otherwise been determined
eligible for release) and the fact that a defendant is represented by (or was determined eligible for)
assigned counsel are significant indicators of present inability to pay any fine. In conjunction with
other factors, they may also indicate that the defendant is not likely to become able to pay any
fine.”).
147. See, e.g., State v. Lefever, 632 N.E.2d 589, 595 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding that defendant’s name on bond was not conclusive proof of source of funds when defendant’s father submitted
proof of ownership).
148. See, e.g., State v. Giordano, 661 A.2d 1311, 1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (reversing application of bail funds for restitution when funds had been assigned to defense counsel
for fees by third-party bond depositor).
149. See Estate of Lyon v. Heemstra, No. 9-105/08-0934, 2009 Iowa App. LEXIS 578, at *9–
11 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2009) (finding that cash bail posted by a third party cannot be garnished
for purpose of court-ordered restitution); People v. Mompier, 657 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (holding that bail funds posted by third party were not subject to tax lien attached to criminal
defendant’s property); Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skelton, 700 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Ark. 1985) (holding that
bond posted by third party was not subject to garnishment or attachment by criminal defendant’s
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and co-defendants.150 Each claimant has their own varying interest.151
Issues of ownership become more complicated when the bond has been
assigned and the acquiring person is not apparent from the record before
the court. Often, bail funds are assigned to defense counsel to defray legal
expenses without notice to the court that the defendant no longer owns
the funds.152 The defendant’s bail funds may be assigned to avoid attachment from creditors.153 An assignment of bail funds to a third party, although valid, may be subject to state statute.154
When a dispute arises between a defendant and a third party regarding
ownership of bail funds for purposes of applying them to fines, court
costs, or restitution, the burden of proof is on the government as the beneficiary of the funds if applied to fines and court costs.155 Construing 28
U.S.C. § 2044, the court in United States v. Gonzalez noted that if Congress had intended to put the burden on the defendant or third party, the

creditor). But see Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1098 (Ind. 2018) (finding that bond is the
criminal defendant’s asset and is subject to attachment after the case concludes).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, No. 1-18-CR-30-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33549, at *1,
*9 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 2020) (holding that government could not retain defendant’s bail funds,
which belonged to his wife, or apply them to his co-defendants’ or his wife’s restitution obligations
arising from a different case).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Dipofi, Nos. 04-80707-01 & 07-50695, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51972, at *3, *5 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 2008) (finding that defendant, defendant’s attorney, government, and defendant’s parents each had an interest in claiming bail funds but only defendant’s
parents, as owners of funds, were entitled to claim it).
152. See United States v. Forte, Cr. No. 85-141-1, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22869, at *1–2, *10
(E.D. Pa. July 14, 1986) (holding that bail funds paid by defendant’s wife and assigned to defense
counsel for legal expenses were not available to be applied to defendant’s court-ordered restitution);
Giordano, 661 A.2d at 1314 (holding that bond defendant’s father posted and later assigned to
defense counsel for attorney fees was not available to be applied to restitution after defendant’s
conviction).
153. United States v. Rubenstein involved a bank attempting to garnish bail funds. 971 F.2d
288, 290 (9th Cir. 1992). A third party paid the funds to the defendant’s attorney who deposited the
bail funds in the defendant’s name. Id. at 290–91. To avoid garnishment, the defendant assigned
the bail funds to the third party and disclaimed any ownership in the funds. Id. at 291. Later, the
third party assigned one-half of the bail funds to the defendant to pay restitution with the hope of a
more lenient sentence. Id. at 292. One of the issues raised was the third party’s intent to provide the
funds to the defendant as a gift or loan and the extent to which, if any, the defendant had any control
over the use of the funds. Id. at 296, 298.
154. People v. Cerna, 2014 IL App (3d) 140225-U, ¶ 15. Although the court approved the assignment of the bail funds to defense counsel for legal fees, under statute, the assignment was limited to the balance of the funds after deductions for the fines and court costs. Id. ¶ 16. In this case
the fines and court costs exceeded the bail funds, with no payment to defense counsel. Id. ¶¶ 16–
17.
155. United States v. Gonzalez, No. 11-CR-80211-MARRA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24109, at
*9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2013). See also United States v. Melgen, No. 15-80049-CR-MARRA, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215368, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2017) (holding that government bears burden
to prove funds posted as bond belong to defendant).
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statute would have done so by its plain language.156 In Gonzalez, the third
party testified that he paid some of the bail money himself and raised the
rest from family and friends, although he did not have records of the
amounts received from each person.157 The government’s argument that
the defendant had obtained a significant amount of money from
healthcare fraud and that the third party was unemployed was not sufficient to prove the bail funds belonged to the defendant.158 When there is
proof of ownership of the bail funds by a third party, the government must
offer some evidence to show that the defendant owns the funds.159
A dispute over ownership of the funds is not limited to the government.
A defendant may claim the bail funds posted by a third party.160 The defendant also has a direct interest in prevailing on a claim for the funds to
reduce any financial burden through a credit against a fine from the funds
advanced by the third party. When the defendant’s name is the only one
on the bond receipt, the court has no way of knowing from the record that
the funds were posted by a third party. In such a case, the defendant may
consent to apply the bond to the fines and court costs without notice to
the third-party owner of the funds.
A defendant, however, should not be permitted to avoid payment of a
fine or court costs merely because someone else’s name is on the bond
receipt. The bail money may have been advanced by the third party,
whom the defendant later reimbursed and who no longer has a claim to
the funds. Mere unsupported statements by a defendant that the bond
money was provided by a friend, when other evidence shows the defendant paid the bond from the defendant’s own personal savings, does not

156. Gonzalez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24109, at *11–12.
157. Id. at *3.
158. Id. at *12–13 (finding that government failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that
funds in question belonged to Gonzalez and not to any third party).
159. United States v. Hughes, No. 3:15-CR-11, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86974, at *4–5 (S.D.
Tex. June 6, 2017) (holding that government’s position of community property with defendant was
not sufficient to rebut a spouse’s proof of sole ownership of bail funds without evidence that funds
spouse had posted were held as community property). When, however, the bail funds are paid from
a joint account with the defendant, the government may prevail on the claim for the bail funds.
United States v. Hernandez, No. 11-20130-CR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131779, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 15, 2011). In Hernandez, the court noted that a different analysis would be applied if the bail
funds came from the spouse’s separate account. Id.
160. State v. Recanati, 724 A.2d 814, 818 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). An affidavit of
ownership by the co-defendant filed when the funds were deposited with the court established ownership and intent of parties. Id. at 816. Although drawn from the co-defendant’s account, Recanati
presented evidence he had repaid his co-defendant and was entitled to the funds. Id. Affirming the
decision to release the funds to the co-defendant, the court noted that the proper remedy was a civil
action between the two defendants. Id. at 818.
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preclude the court from applying the bond to the fines and court costs.161
The name on a bond receipt creates a presumption of ownership unless
challenged.162 Although a good starting point, it is not conclusive. An
evidentiary hearing may be required to resolve conflicting claims regardless of whose name appears on the bond receipt.163 The printed language
on the bond form or receipt is usually nonnegotiable and requires the person depositing the funds to sign it to secure the defendant’s release.164
When a local rule requires a bond must only be put in a defendant’s name,
the receipt may not be determinative of the ownership of the funds.165
Bank statements or other records showing withdrawal of funds contemporaneous with or near in time to the bail being posted are relevant to
rebut the name on the bond receipt as the owner of the funds.166
The source of the bail funds, while relevant, may not by itself establish
ownership. Other considerations include the third party’s intent if it was
meant as a gift, loan, or payment of some other unrelated debt owed to
the defendant.167 In such cases, the determination of ownership of the
funds is not based solely on the documents presented to the court, but also
the credibility of the witnesses asserting disputed claims.168
When the issues are more complicated, such as assignment of the bail
161. See State v. Cooper, No. 96-CA-28, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2498, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 28, 1997) (“[A]lthough appellant presented evidence that the money used to post bond belonged to appellant’s friends rather than to appellant himself, the court was not bound to accept that
testimony on its face.”).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Starkie, No. 98-4415, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 193, at *11 (4th
Cir. 1999) (explaining that defendant’s name on bond receipt was substantial evidence that bond
belonged to him rather than third party who posted it).
163. See United States v. Ener, 278 F. Supp. 2d. 441, 441, 449–50 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that,
although defendant’s name appeared on bond receipt, funds belonged to codefendant’s wife and
should be returned to her). See also Sharp v. State, 142 N.E.3d 435, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding an issue of fact whether bail funds procured by now-deceased defendant selling his car belonged
to his wife, who posted bail but never claimed money was hers, or to defendant’s estate).
164. See, e.g., Nashville Cmty. Bail Fund v. Gentry, 446 F. Supp. 3d 282, 292 (M.D. Tenn.,
2020) (Gentry I) (“Bail amounts are paid through the Clerk of the Criminal Court . . . the office
will no longer accept NCBF’s payments unless the NCBF representative making the payment signs
the office’s notification form acknowledging that the bail amounts will be applied to fines, fees,
costs, taxes, or restitution.”).
165. See Cargill v. Spradlin, No. 17-85-26, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 10077, at *1-2, *11 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1987) (finding that local rule requiring bond funds to be deposited in defendant’s
name was not determinative of ownership of those funds).
166. See, e.g., Ener, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 449–50 (finding that, although bond receipt listed only
defendant’s name, evidence that a third party paid bond from her personal account was relevant in
determining ownership).
167. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954, 961 (Or. 2020) (holding that when non-spouse,
third-party family member posts security, court must assess in determining ownership whether donative intent or other evidence existed that money was defendant’s property).
168. See generally United States v. Rubenstein, 971 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1992).
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funds without court notice, an evidentiary hearing may be needed to resolve ownership issues. A hearing provides procedural safeguards and a
forum, regardless of the outcome, with notice to the defendant, government, third party, or other person or entity to assert the merits of any claim
on the funds.
D. A Cautionary Note
Third-party bond use may result in abuse beyond the loss of the third
party’s funds. In Commonwealth v. Persavage, coercion by a threat of
third-party bond forfeiture was used to induce a guilty plea.169 The defendant’s mother had posted the bond for her son, putting up her home as
collateral for the bond in an unrelated criminal case also involving her
son.170 Although the defendant had appeared for all court dates, the prosecutor warned that bond-forfeiture proceedings would begin in the other,
unrelated case based upon noncompliance with the conditions of bond
unless the defendant accepted the plea offer in the current case.171 From
the record, part of the plea agreement included the withdrawal of the
bond-forfeiture motion in the other case.172
On appeal, the court found the bond forfeiture was a coercive factor in
the defendant’s decision to change his plea.173 The court also found the
plea was not knowingly made and was based on a legal misconception of
bond forfeiture.174 The court noted that while a bond could be forfeited
for nonappearance, it could not be forfeited for noncompliance with other
terms or conditions of the bond.175 While this example is extreme, it is
also a real-life situation.
CONCLUSION
Municipal and other misdemeanor and traffic courts are generally dependent on local funding and under pressure to raise revenue. Revenue in
169. See generally Commonwealth v. Persavage, No. 1697 MDA 2017, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 4027 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2018).
170. Id. at *8.
171. Id. at *7.
172. Id. at *9.
173. Id. at *12–13. Cf. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 867–68 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing denial of
writ of habeas corpus based on defendant’s guilty plea when defendant’s brother, who posted bail,
threatened to withdraw bail if defendant did not plead guilty, combined with erroneous sentencing
advice from counsel).
174. Persavage, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4027, at *11–12. The appellate court agreed
with the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s plea was invalid because bail forfeiture should not
have been a factor in his decision to plead guilty, although it reversed the trial court’s decision on
procedural grounds. Id. at *11, 13.
175. Id. at *11 (“Bail forfeitures as to a family member’s property should only be enforced as
to a defendant’s failure to appear.”).
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a court system, however, is an incidental benefit, not the goal in setting
bonds or imposing fines. Compulsory application of third-party bond
funds requires a third party with no criminal culpability, whether an individual or nonprofit organization, to guarantee not only the defendant’s
appearance in court, but also the payment of future, undetermined fines
and other expenses.
The touchstone of any post-judgment inquiry for the disposition of
money deposited as bail is ownership of the funds. First and foremost, the
bail funds are always in the possession and control of the court. The court
makes the final determination of distribution of the bail funds. This includes the authority to hold or release funds until all competing claims
can be raised and decided.
Distribution of bail funds after the case is terminated is based on three
fundamental principles: 1) the bail is posted to secure the appearance of
the defendant for all phases of the proceedings in the trial court, 2) the
bail funds should be released to their owner, and 3) a fine is imposed as
a punishment for criminal behavior based on the conduct of the defendant
and other relevant sentencing factors, not as a means to generate revenue.
Applying the third-party bond to the fine or court fee, instead of requiring payment directly from the defendant, is a breakdown of the justice
system, for the fine does not accomplish its intended purpose. Instead, the
third party’s bond becomes the means to satisfy the defendant’s fine and
generate revenue, but there is neither a deterring effect nor a punitive impact on the defendant. In state courts, similar to the statutory requirement
in the federal system,176 once the case is terminated and ownership of the
bail funds is determined to be someone other than the defendant, the bail
has served its purpose and the funds should be released to the third party.

176. 28 U.S.C. § 2044.

